

AN ASSESSMENT OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN POST-INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES: THE CASE OF GHANA, BOTSWANA AND NIGERIA

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Abstract: The 1960s is a very significant period in the history of Africa as by the end of that era, most African States had achieved independence. This period also marked the end of seventy-five years of Western-European domination in the African Continent. Nevertheless, behind the veil of independence lay harsh realities of distressing developmental challenges as a result of political fragility, inappropriate institutions, unskilled human resources, rapid population growth, and the legacy of pre-colonial history. Ten years after independence, some African states experienced a deepening crisis of democracy signaled by a series of military coups as a result of tension between civilian and military leaders. A brief period of economic growth in the African States followed soon after independence however, African States quickly succumbed to economic recession from around 1969 which ballooned into a deepening economic crisis by 1979. World Bank and the International Monetary Fund offered financial support to African economies conditional to the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programmes however, two decades later these programs had failed to stimulate sustained economic growth. While it is difficult to analyze democratic governance and economic reforms in the entire African Continent, the examples of Ghana, Botswana, and Nigeria will provide a systematic assessment.

Keywords: Democracy, Democratic Governance, Economic Reforms.

I. INTRODUCTION

Democracy is defined as a system of governance that involves the citizens of a country deciding their desires and necessities via free, fair and periodic multiparty elections (Todd, 2005). There are many perceptions of what it means to be democratic or what a democracy signifies. Regrettably, many of these perceptions are linear, Western-oriented models which often overlook the cultural and historical differences of democracy in pre-colonial African systems of democratic governance (Cappelen, Sorens, & Cappelen, 2018). Western principles of democracy and characteristics of a democratic country have tarnished the Africa's conception of the democratization process (Todd, 2011). These Western notions that manifested during colonial times unfortunately still linger in the post-colonial period whereby Africans have been told by the West that the practice of democracy must fall within particular practices and principles for them to be considered democratic states (Todd, 2005).

The guiding principles that act as the foundation of a democracy include the observation of the rule of law, protected rights and freedoms, free and fair elections, and accountability and transparency of government officials. However, as countries have continued to grow, so have these practices and principles become more complex as democratic principles

now vary from country to country. In fact, democracy in Western countries initially deemed as observers of democracy now differ from one another and these differences are also visible amongst the countries of Africa (Beetham, Carvalho, Landman, & Weir, 2008). To understand Africa's democracy today, one has to look at Africa's democracy before the European encounter. Exploring the pre-colonial African cultures will provide an opening towards discerning the present-day African democracy therefore, understanding the foundational history of African countries will provide a link between Africa's traditional and current democracies (Afful, 2015).

PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA

The political systems, structures and political practices in Africa as well as the norms, rules and traditions that underpin them are rooted in diverse historical contexts. Three pre-colonial African governance systems have been identified by different scholars namely, large centralized empires and kingdoms, centralized medium-size kingdoms and decentralized empires and chiefdoms. The large centralized empires and kingdoms were governed by Kings who had absolute power. This governance system was pyramidal and akin in significant respect to the European counterparts. Kings operated large court systems with a lot of opulence and were assisted by court officials, vassal heads and bureaucrats who held their positions in trust for the king and whose continued tenure and life depended on their loyalty to the king. The king and the courts performed executive, legislative and judicial functions thus there was no separation of power (Sesay, 2014).

Striking similarities exist between pre-colonial African, Roman and Greek empires in Europe as well as the Mogul empires in Asia who were absolute monarchs. These large centralized African systems of governance did not last forever as most of them succumbed either to protracted succession competitions or to an incumbents failure to consolidate power and control as a result of the expansiveness of territories and ambitions of vassal chiefs. Centralized medium kingdoms on the other hand were organized into medium sized city-states with centralized and pyramidal authority structures. These medium sized kingdoms were much more urbanized, and their kings had immense powers which they shared only with trusted associates. Law making, execution and adjudication functions were specific to the king-in-council. Vital economic resources such as land and revenue from collected taxes and security were monopolized by the royal elites. Countries like Nigeria (Oyo and Ife Kingdoms), Ghana (Ashanti Empire), Uganda (Buganda and Bunyoro Kingdoms) and South Africa (Zulu Kingdom) had centralized medium-sized governance systems (Sesay, 2014).

The third and final form of government system in pre-colonial Africa was the widely dispersed empires and chiefdoms which had well organized and centralized administrative structures without kings, chiefs or any identifiable ruling elites. However, the absence of centralized systems of authority did not in no way imply statelessness as these societies had law and order and prohibitions for deviant behavior. Leadership was based on rotational rather than hereditary practices and elected leaders were responsible for collective decisions making and implementation processes. The executive, legislative and judicial functions were spread across different centers of power for instance among village councils of elders, secret societies and age grades; age played an important factor during the selection process of leaders in this system (Sesay, 2014).

The system of widely dispersed empires and chiefdoms also utilized the checks and balance principles to avoid concentrating power to one individual or group. Countries that practiced this type of system included South Sudan, the Maasai in Kenya, Tinga in Zambia and so forth. Colonialist encountered serious challenges in these empires because of the absence of a clear source of authority. Thus, the colonial masters appointed chiefs to act as middlemen between them and the local communities; this happened without the regard to prevailing governance practices that emphasized age and lineage. This brought about frequent uprisings against the colonialist due to the fact that the privileges and rights of the appointed chiefs eroded the powers of existing structures and institutions. In Eastern Nigeria for instance, the Okpara and Umuada age grades were neglected following the appointment of warrant chiefs by the colonial masters (Ihemeje, 2019).

Colonialism symbolized a critical milestone in the evolution of African governance systems in Africa. African kings of large centralized kingdoms and empires answerable to no one came under the control of colonial masters through conquests, depositions or treaties and their powers were radically reduced. Some of the centralized pyramidal political structures were incorporated into the colonial systems in order to serve the interests of the colonial masters. The royal elites were allowed to retain their status only if they served the interest of the colonial administration (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013). The colonialist also set the groups apart in colonial territories in order to weaken any opposition against their administration. The colonialist also applied divide and rule strategies in medium sized kingdoms and merged or divided different kingdoms into smaller administrative units in order to dwindle resistance to in direct rule (Hawksley, 2001).

There were many differences in traditional African governance systems ranging from societies governed by hierarchical structures characterised by dispersed authority and consensus-building. These governance systems also reflected underlying socio-economic factors, such as resource endowment as well as population densities even though the specific political arrangements emerged from complex societal processes. This notwithstanding, there existed a rich body of constitutional practices in pre-colonial Africa characterized by accountability, reciprocity and political legitimacy by which rulers were challenged when they exceeded established cultural and political norms. Colonial rulers displaced traditional political institutions by force where pre-colonial forms of rule formed the basis of imperial hegemony thus existing African leaders had to collaborate with colonial authorities in return for preservation of power held (Healey & Robinson, 1994).

II. POST-COLONIAL AFRICA

Africa's struggle for self-determination was not just a struggle against colonial rule as it also aimed at national liberation and economic transformation. Africa hoped that decolonization would usher in new democratic dispensations that would open the continent's political, economic and cultural space for freedom from oppression, marginalization and want (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020). The exercise of self-determination as a nation, as a people and as diverse groups would have produced developmental, independent and democratic States capable of empowering their people and improving the human condition. Unfortunately, upon accession to independence and seizure of State power, the political elites who were themselves products of the colonial era replicated the colonial State and entrenched highly centralized, authoritarian and self-serving features into their governments (Andebrhan et al., 2017).

Many observers were optimistic about Africa's enduring long-term democratic rule after attaining independence. This view was reinforced by the many expectations aroused by the allure of self-rule and by the nationalist leaders who used democratic arguments to push for independence. Liberal constitutional arrangements had been created for some countries specifically those governed by France or Britain to facilitate the transfer of power. However these arrangements were subject to the bargaining and consultation between the colonial masters and the nationalist African leaders (Hawksley, 2001). For instance, Nigeria and Ghana's constitutional reforms preceded the introduction of competitive elections and regional self-rule in early 1950s. These constitutional provisions were meant to provide opportunities for greater African participation in politics and to instil democratic traditions which had persisted despite the many interruptions.

Nationalists used liberal democratic frameworks of the colonial metropolitan state as the authoritative blueprint for the post-colonial regime despite the fact that this was at odds with the autocratic traditions of the colonial era (Healey & Robinson, 1994). Notably, the benign aspects of colonial inheritance should never be overstated; autocracy enforced by repression was the dominant characteristic of colonial rule. Constitutional reforms came much later and were implemented to stop the radical rise of nationalism as well as the installation of regimes which appeared hostile to the idea of maintaining linkages with the former colonial powers. These reforms had little regard for the indigenous political culture as they ensured the dominance of the political elite, nonetheless many African countries that achieved independence in the early 1960s were committed to liberal democratic governance. Thus, competitive multiparty elections had to take place for regimes to come to power (Healey & Robinson, 1994).

Founding leaders of post-colonial African countries believed that they had earned the right to rule by virtue of them being prominent in the struggle for independence. Most of these leaders started out with objectives to achieve modernization goals, fulfil popular expectations and maintain themselves in office. Nationalist leaders initially shared an implicit belief to establish representative institutions within a democratic framework that would engineer social change with the hope of shedding pre-existing ethnic allegiances and identity completely with modern post-colonial state secular values (Domingues, 2019). However, there was a huge difference between nationalist states that attained independence peacefully to those that attained independence through military struggle, and this conditioned the form of rule in post-colonial Africa. Many nationalist leaders wedded to socialist ideologies were inclined towards one-party states for instance African Socialism adopted by Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine adopted by regimes of Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia in the mid-1970s (Healey & Robinson, 1994).

In contrast to the expectations of the many optimistic observers, liberal democracy in independent African countries was short-lived. A few years after achieving self-rule, the governance trend shifted in favour of authoritarianism characterized by elimination of political competitors, creation of one-party states through military takeover or constitutionally. Some elected African governments were responsible for the elimination of democracy through any means possible including

executive coups. Ghana for instance a highly centralised presidential system was legitimized by a referendum in 1960 and this paved way for a repressive one-party state with Kwame Nkrumah as its leader. Another example is that of Uganda where Milton Obote transitioned to authoritarian rule by changing the constitution and crushing all other political oppositions by using force (Healey & Robinson, 1994).

Modern African authoritarianism after independence was characterized by the removal of constitutional rights from political opponents, elimination of institutional checks and balances, regulation and confinement of political participation, centralization and concentration of state power in presidential offices and the termination of open party politics. Post-colonial leaders used three mechanisms to disarm opposition parties to secure cooperation from ethnic and regional interest groups; co-optation and consultation, patronage entailing the exchange of state resources in exchange of political support and agreements to perform or desist from performing particular activities such as organizing rallies against the sitting regime. Autocratic rulers resulted to the use of coercive methods to enforce compliance (Healey & Robinson, 1994).

In countries like Nigeria, democratic rule was abrupt and bloody due to military intervention whereby civilian rule ended through a military coup in 1966 where the then prime minister, politicians and senior military officers were assassinated. A number of successive coups followed and Nigeria has experienced only four years of democratic governance (Mafeje, 2002). Ghana on the other hand had a military intervention that took place in 1966 which reversed authoritarian political tendencies however this was short lived as the coup that took place in 1972 installed a repressive military regime. Many other African countries followed this similar trend with military intervention becoming the mechanism for political succession due to conflicting ideologies and different ethnic compositions. Half of the African countries were ruled by military or quasi-military government or one-party governments or hereditary monarchs by the year 1984 (Healey & Robinson, 1994).

This authoritarian shift from the mid-1960s was justified on the need for centralized states to further nation-building and economic modernization objectives. The traditional forms of decision-making which emphasised on patrimonial authority provided justification of one-party states and anchored various ideological beliefs that Western democratic forms were inappropriate for countries with widespread illiteracy and absence of industrialization. By late 1960s, most one-party regimes had become increasingly authoritarian and nationalist leaders were concerned with achieving national unity while still clinging to power. They tried to consolidate control over the civil society through the reduction of the scope for opposition activity and curbing the formation and independence of trade unions and other interest groups (Young, Jackson, & Rosberg, 1983). Nationalist parties transformed into entrenched political monopolies that offered rewards to individual or groups in form of political office or public sector employment (Zolberg, 1968)

Single party regimes turned into instruments of control and incorporation instead of mobilization. They drew on coercive methods favoured by colonial states namely, principle features of control, centralization of administrative structures and forms of leadership influenced by their personalities while using eclectic brands of legitimising their doctrines. A handful of countries such as Botswana, Mauritius and Gambia managed to distance themselves from the authoritarian trend and retained competitive multi-party systems since independence. For instance, the Tswana in Botswana share a similar language and cultural traditions and the dominant ethnic group accommodates other smaller groups thus encouraging political stability. The local government of Botswana also widened political participation and consults traditional communal assemblies before formulating and implementing policies (Molutsi & Holm, 1990). Nonetheless, the country has had one party rule since independence giving rise to a dominant one-party situation (Stevens & Speed, 1977). Democratic norms are not completely lacking as countries like Botswana upheld democratic ethos (Healey & Robinson, 1994).

African inheritors of colonial states found easy access to power and instruments of political control and economic allocation which had already been structured by the colonial masters. Low levels of development, poverty, poor resource endowment, small domestic markets, dependence on limited primary exports and vulnerability to external shocks were some of the difficult circumstance faced by post-colonial African leaders. These problems restricted the room to maneuver for African leaders and limited the extent to which they could fulfill popular expectations through economic development. This led to an economic growth gap between the ideological perceptions of the leaders and their capacity to implement the much needed policies (Healey & Robinson, 1994). A further explanation for the erosion of democratic norms is pegged on the unwillingness of politicians to hand over power and instead use government machinery to

preserve power and privileged access to the resources at their disposal (Healey & Robinson, 1994). These problems are the reasons for democracy decay and economic decline in some post-colonial African states however, some countries have thrived democratically and economically despite these challenges.

III. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The democratic governance and the principles of democracy are continuous subjects highly discussed within the international community. Nevertheless, what constitutes a democracy has changed due to the changes countries have undergone over the years consequently, different definitions of the term democratic governance have emerged (Afful, 2015). The definition by (Ikpi, 2007) explains democratic governance as the total ability to organize, synthesize and direct the various actions of the working parts of a government machinery in order for such a government to perform meaningfully, creditably and acceptably. Consequently, the art of governance involves both the governing class and the governed people and good governance must of necessity be democratic, entail public and popular participation from the people, maintain accountability and ensure basic human rights and freedoms. Additionally, (Akpotor, 2001) asserts that governance should cover the multifaceted and innumerable relations that exist between a government and the people. He further asserted that the extent to which the people's issues are accomplished is dependent on the political elite thus, governance could either be good or bad.

In many post-colonial African countries, democracy consisted of one-party regimes which did not create the element of competition needed in a democratic country. Countries like Ghana and Nigeria governed under one-party regimes eventually experienced coup d'états. Other countries experienced crippling civil wars from which a few managed to emerge; most countries fell under authoritarian rule. Africa's transition to democracy was a momentous event within the international community and as nations gradually attained autonomy, restructuring the government and economy were of high priority across African countries. This new chapter brought about the pressures of whether African countries could sufficiently support themselves without direct assistance from their colonizers. Foreign aid from Western donors was used as an incentive for African countries to economic development. The agreements that African countries made with western donors were for development and promotion of democratic governance. However, African governments were poorly guided and irresponsible with their financial obligations to prior loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This created numerous concerns across the international community on aiding African countries struggling financially post-independence (Afful, 2015).

Thus, the 1980s saw the Bretton Woods institutions and other international financial institutions impose structural adjustment and economic stabilization programs as conditional ties for their assistance to African governments. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the U.S. Agency for International Development instituted policy changes, such as currency devaluation, removal of subsidies for public services, reduction of state intervention in agricultural pricing and marketing, greater concern to the development needs of rural areas, privatization of parastatal bodies, and reduction in the size and cost of the public sector. Besides, these institutions started showing interest in promoting political change with great emphasis on democratic political change (Herbst, 1990). These conditions were adopted by other donors as well; France proposed greater liberty and democracy, Great Britain recommended good governance while the United States focus on good governance and democracy. Regardless of the conditions imposed, they all strongly believed that political reforms in post-colonial Africa must result in reduced corruption, better governance and efficiency, encourage participatory politics, and a liberalized market economy which would bring the continent closer to meaningful economic growth and development (Kpundeh, 1992).

Different donors concerned with development and poverty reduction in post-colonial Africa have also have a definition to the term democratic governance. The World Bank, for instance, defines governance as "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development (World Bank, 1991). The definitions varied because the reforms were opportunistic interventions aimed at taking advantage of the political and economic malaise in Africa. On the other hand, Africans had been concerned about the absence of democracy and good governance in their states and conceptualized the problem in terms of betrayal by the neo-colonial state and not in terms of the international financial institutions. Consequently, Africa became a victim of the drive by the metropolitan states, in particular the West, towards uni-polarism with their economies being dismantled for imperialistic and ideological reasons. For the success of the Structural Adjustment Programmes, the financial institutions required conformist African governments but also did not want to appear to be supporting dictatorships in Africa. On the other hand, while demanding

that African states take a back seat in development, they required conformist authoritarian governments to implement their unpopular programmes. Therefore, the World Bank's concept of "good governance" earlier mentioned had undemocratic connotations. Also, it ignored completely the needs of African small producers, a view that was confirmed by the Khartoum Declaration (1988) that called for development with a "human face" (United Nations, 1988).

Intellectuals in Africa began to criticize the neo-colonial state and African governments in general and opted to defend the integrity and autonomy of the African state. They ultimately rejected the World Bank's concept of "good governance". This shifted the focus to the actual failures and excesses of African governments. It had become apparent to intellectuals and popular forces that the issue was the behavior of the state towards its citizens. From this premise, the neo-colonial African state focused on benefitting the ruling class rather than the well-being of its citizens. This led to the conclusion that the citizens will need to entail sustained social struggles for the state to become subject to their will (Mafeje, 2002). Reforms such as separation of powers, representative government, the supremacy of parliament, rule of law, and an accountable bureaucracy are all parts of the struggle in transforming the African neo-colonial state. However, the question remained as to whether there is such a thing as "good governance" and "bad governance" as some scholars posited that "bad governance" meant no governance. The verdict was "democratic governance", which implies regular interaction between the government and civil society and free participation by the latter through its institutions and popular organs (Mafeje, 2002).

Botswana has been a beacon of democratic governance in Africa since gaining independence in 1966. Numerous governance indicators show Botswana performing exceptionally well in the continent, receiving high ratings for sub-indicators such as government effectiveness, participation and human rights, regulatory quality, political stability, rule of law and control of corruption. Its democratic credentials have earned the country prestige in the international community out of proportion to its size, and a seat in the UN Security Council. On the whole, a substantial degree of democratic consolidation has occurred (Sebudubudu, 2010). Its government operates on the model of separation-of-powers, with the three branches of government – legislature, judiciary and executive; relatively independent of one another to facilitate accountability. The executive is accountable to parliament through a presidential state of the nation address that is widely debated in parliament and by the media, a budget speech, questions and motion time by members of parliament (MPs) directed at certain government policies, and a latent vote of no confidence which parliament can use to depose the government. The states' judiciary is autonomous and holds the executive and the legislature accountable. Local governance is a strong pillar in Botswana's democracy. The state has established district and town councils, and chieftaincies and district commissioners continue to exist, adding to the variety of local institutions pursuing local democracy and development (Alexander & Kaboyakgosi, 2012).

The state also observes human rights with its citizens enjoying certain freedoms incorporated in the Constitution as 'first-generation rights', such as the right to freedom of association, the right to life and the right to freedom of movement. The civil society also enjoys many freedoms, such as the freedom to operate in the country without hindrance or harassment by the State. The government has, to date, been fully capable of setting the terms of engagement with non-state actors, often those it does not wish to deal with. The society utilizes various methods to engage the state, such as through direct confrontation, negotiation, partnerships and even international alliances. These allows citizens to express themselves on a number of issues, and they have helped to ensure transparency and accountability of the government system. The civil society organizations such as trade unions, women and youth organisations, human rights organisation, and the media publish different opinions on national issues, protest and hold demonstrations against certain government policies and activities, sponsor court cases against the government, and observe elections. In turn, the government solicits the views and approval of citizens on a number of issues through kgotla meetings, workshops, referendums and elections (Alexander & Kaboyakgosi, 2012).

Another affirmation of Botswana's democratic governance is that the government consistently invests diamond revenues, which its economy is greatly dependent on, into extensive social expenditure for the protection of less affluent members of the society. The country has been credited as a resource-rich developmental state. The state has been ranked as one of the highest per capita spenders on education in Africa, among others. For instance, on health, an estimated 85% of the population are within a five-kilometer radius of a health facility and 96% have access to healthy drinking water. However, diversification of the economy has not sufficiently materialised, poverty is reducing at a slow pace and unemployment and HIV/Aids are adding to human suffering. In response to HIV/AIDS, the government provides free, universal access to antiretroviral drugs to members of the population with HIV/AIDS (The African Capacity Building Foundation, 2016).

Ghana's political post-independence experience has been marred by approximately 26 years of intermittent military rule and 36 years of civilian administration. With the exception of the First Republic under Nkrumah (1960-1966), the interludes of civilian governments under the Second (1969-72) and Third (1979-81) Republics have not been able to survive for up to three years without being overthrown in a coup d'état. The transition towards Democratic governance began in the early 1990s with the introduction of multiparty elections, ushering Ghana into its Fourth Republic. This was within the background of devastating and unenviable economic and social indicators. Since then, the country has held successful and credible elections. There has not been direct ballot-rigging, and a free and highly critical media and dynamic civil society facilitate open pre-election debate. Legitimation through elections is underscored by the fact that it is one of the few countries in Africa where governments have not only been voted out of office but have actually vacated the field for the new incumbents in 2000 and 2008 (Mark, Peter, & Adowa, 2011).

Beside successful elections, Ghana has also made considerable progress in institutionalising multiparty democratic governance within the framework of the 1992 Constitution. A key feature of the Constitution is strong emphasis on human rights protection enshrined in chapter five as 'Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms'. The chapter is dedicated to the promotion and protection of a wide range of civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights (Constitute Project, 2013). Additionally, the government constantly undertakes reforms to give formal legal protection to the rights of certain socially disadvantaged groups and individuals. They include the passage of a Human Trafficking Act of 2005 (Act 694) to combat the growing trafficking of children for forced labour, and a Domestic Violence Act of 2007 (Act 732) to protect women and girls from all forms of violence at all places (Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1996).

There is also a high level of participation of civil society actors in political processes in Ghana. They play a vital role in the preparation of the national development strategies, monitoring the strategies, budgetary policy and sectoral political processes. Prior to the return to multiparty democratic governance in 1992, not only was the space for civil society participation severely curtailed, but also majority of these organizations suffered from harassment, intimidation and ridicule on public platforms and in the media. Despite the actors' greater involvement in government policies, they still face a number of constraints one of them being poor access to critical information which weakens the capacity of civil society to proactively engage state institutions in the decision-making processes (Arthur, 2014).

The state is based on a decentralized system of local governance to facilitate the Democratic process of giving power to the people. Under the Constitution, the state is mandated to take appropriate measures to make democracy a reality by decentralizing the administrative and financial machinery of government to the regions and districts and by providing all possible opportunities to the people to participate in decision making at every level of national life and in government. The functions, powers, responsibilities and resource transferred from the Central Government to local Government are united (Debrah, 2014).

Nigeria's transition to Democratic governance is still a work in progress. When the country gained independence in 1960, it inherited from the British; a parliamentary democracy with three unequal regional political structures namely; the North monarchy with full executive power vested in it, the West monarchy with executive power not fully vested in the monarch, the East which was a Republican system of governance, and the legacy of traditional administrative system at different levels of political development (Gberevbie, 2009). This strained political contest in the country as it lacked a national outlook. The country fell into the firm grip of military dictatorship for years, till 1999 when the ruling military government instituted a transition to civil rule that culminated into democratic governance. However, years after this transition, the state still faces a deepening crisis of democracy with its political experience characterized by crude politics, corruption, selfishness and greed of the political leadership (Gberevbie, 2015).

The prolonged military rule in the country resulted in the over-centralization and concentration of power by the president. The country's strive towards democratic governance resulted in an authoritarian form of governance as elected leaders in the three tiers of government exhibited military traits and values in governance. Violence and political intolerance has been at the earmark of politics, even between parties and candidates. Ultimately, the prize is capturing and retaining power at all possible cost (Jegade, 2013). The 2015 presidential election marked the first time an incumbent president had lost re-election. The 2019 national election was largely deemed free, fair, and credible by international and domestic observation groups, but was marred by intimidation, irregularities, and public indifference. This reflects both the strength and deficiency in the state's democracy (Verjee, Kwaja, & Onubogu, 2019). Nigeria ranks 146 out of 180 corrupt countries in the world, in the Transparency Internationals 2019 corruption perceptions index (Transparency International, 2019).

The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria made the doctrine of separation of powers a cardinal principle of governance. It vested the powers of government in separate organs of government, namely the executive, legislature, and judiciary. The importance of the theory of separation of powers in enhancing the role of judiciary in achieving sustainable democratic governance in the state was succinctly stated by Ikenga Oraegbunam that *a government of separated powers is less likely to be tyrannical and more likely to follow the rule of law. It also prevents one branch of government from dominating the others or dictating the laws to the public* (Maduekwe, Ojukwu, & Agbata, 2016). However, a major constraint has been the fact that the executive arm of government appears to dwarf the other arms in the amplitude and plenitude of powers of wields.

IV. ECONOMIC REFORMS.

As mentioned earlier, the beginning of the 1980s saw Africa's economies swiftly decline as a result of economic mismanagement yielding a downturn spiral that undermined economic growth, hindered production and deepened poverty in many African countries. The continent's per capita gross domestic product declined drastically at a rate of 2.8 percent from 1980 to 1987; some countries registered negative growth rates during the same period (Sundaram, Schwank, & Arnim, 2013). Acute fiscal pressures, retreat of global capital and mounting foreign debt led many African countries towards the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; these two institutions introduced market-oriented reforms to be adopted by African states as preconditions to access funds (Mafeje, 2002).

Economic reforms in this context refers to actions taken by a government targeting economic policy instruments designed to effect changes in the behavior of public and/or private economic agents with a view towards either boosting their sustainable and non-inflationary demand addressed to the national economy or increasing their productive investments to achieve national economic growth and employment creation targets (Bakoup, 2013). The IMF's functions involve creating a stable climate for international trade by harmonising its members' monetary policies and maintaining exchange rate stability. Further, it provides temporary financial assistance to countries encountering difficulties with their balance of payments. On the other hand, the World Bank, serves and improves the capacity of countries to trade by lending money to war-ravaged and impoverished countries for reconstruction and development projects (World Bank, 1991).

The view that democracy often accompanies economic reforms is based on strong theoretical arguments. Theoretical arguments state that secured property rights, as guaranteed by a democracy, are considered key to economic development. For instance, autocratic leaders tend to be predatory thus disrupt the economic activity and make reform efforts meaningless. These regimes also have interests postponing reforms in order to maintain rent generating activities for the elite groups; a common trend associated with resource endowed countries in Africa. The World Bank and the IMF insist on democratic rule that is more sensitive to the public interests and willingness to implement economic reforms in order to destroy monopolies in favor of public interests. On the other hand, empirical evidence that reforms are highly correlated with democracy is limited to reforms in specific sectors namely, international trade and finance, micro-reforms or to specific countries over a short period of time (Giuliano, Mishra, & Spilimbergo, 2013).

Democratic regimes are more likely to implement economic reforms as democratically elected governments have greater legitimacy to implementing and sustaining policies that bear short-term costs, strengthen independent legal system to ensure political freedom and democracy – this could lead to successful market reforms. Democracy also provides an environment conducive to economic reforms as it limits rent seeking and puts in place system checks and balances (Giuliano et al., 2013). In a nutshell, democracy is effective for economic development as it stabilises political environment, promotes the rule of law and free selection as well as hinders corruption and profitless policies (Dergisi & Avrasya, 2016).

Botswana provides a good example as to how democracy and economic reforms correlate. Being one of the poorest countries in Africa at independence it quickly turned around and became a success in its development. It has very valuable resources such as diamond, a prudent economic management and a relatively small population which ranks its position to upper mid income country with an agenda of becoming a high-income country by 2036 (Calleja & Prizzon, 2019). Numerous governance indicators show Botswana performing exceptionally well in the continent, receiving high ratings for sub-indicators such as government effectiveness, participation and human rights, regulatory quality, political stability, rule of law and control of corruption (Calleja & Prizzon, 2019).

Economically, Botswana has enjoyed a strong and stable growth since their independence with sizeable fiscal buffers and prudent policies which played a key role in protecting its economy however, it still faces some challenges in the mineral sector, particularly in the mining of diamonds. Botswana's success is as a result of developing an economic strategy in which they continue to exploit the country's minerals. Income from the mining activities is then used to improve social and economic conditions and thus create new economic opportunities while at the same time encouraging the role of foreign aid and private investments. Additionally, transforming the mineral endowment into an endowment of physical and human capital achieves self-sustaining growth because physical and human capital is renewable, whereas the mineral endowment is not (Jefferis, 2014).

Moreover, Botswana's ruling elite is broadly encompassing as it has rural roots and caters for majority interests in the farming and mining sector. Self interest in growth coincides with that of the rural majority, which explains their persistent success over the urban-based opposition. Public investment in urban infrastructure and improved provision of urban social services kept potential opposition takeover at bay. This explanation seems to be consistent with political economic models in which policy makers who need to satisfy larger constituencies, who face checks and balances within the decision making process, who are subject to electoral review and who function in stable institutional environments are more likely to produce good policies for growth (Maipose & Matsheka, 2006). Botswana's economy has enjoyed a strong and stable growth since their independence with sizeable fiscal buffers and prudent policies that played a key role in protecting its economy.

Reforms in Nigeria's economy have also been an integral aspect since independence. Economic reforms that include deregulation of interest rates, exchange rates and entry into banking business have been implemented. Other reforms include, the introduction of indirect monetary policy instruments, the establishment of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation, strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory institutions and deregulation of capital markets. Notwithstanding, inconsistency in policy implementation and corruption have led to the failure off these reforms. The IMF and the Nigerian government have had different opinions as well as common visions regarding the interest of the economy as expressed by President Obasanjo through his leadership in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Osafo-kwaako & Osafo-kwaako, 2007).

The IMF has over the years provided Nigeria with policy advice, technical assistance and training in its areas of expertise, as well as financial support for policies that will help achieve the country's economic and social objectives. However, Nigeria still faces critics for focusing on macroeconomic and related structural policies rather than a broad development agenda. Not all IMF support was successful for example, the \$1 billion pledge in 2000 did achieve some success where inflation was reduced and transparency in the use of public resources was improved. But a big increase in spending in early 2001 fueled a sharp increase in inflation and widened the differential between the official and parallel exchange rates to over 20 percent, distorting the allocation of resources in the economy (Gary G. Moser, 2002).

Though the objectives were not fully met, the IMF and the Nigeria government agreed on an informal framework that would monitor the country's economic policies over a six-month period. It was expected that the six-month framework would be the precursor of a broader three-year program to tackle Nigeria's economic problems, foster growth and reduce poverty. Such a program could have been supported by IMF financing if the Nigerian government were consistent in dealing with the country's economic problems. Consistency could have been used by the government to support its appeal for debt relief from foreign creditors. However, for the same reasons mentioned above, the objectives of this framework were not achieved (Gary G. Moser, 2002). As corruption and poor management of finances continue in the country, the government keeps promising and guaranteeing peoples economic and social rights for the realization of their collective and individual hopes and aspirations. These promises and expectations were the summation of a people's vision of good governance that has remained largely unfulfilled in the country. The IMF continues to offer technical assistance to develop the skills of Nigerian and educate officials on the implementation of economic policy (Fatile, 2012).

The relationship between Ghana the IMF and World Bank dates back to the late 1960s when the country suffered both political and economic instability due to prolonged drought and famine. Additionally, Ghana was also dealing with the burden of resettling one million citizens from Nigeria, the global oil crisis as well as a persistent downward trend in terms of trade. By the 1980s inflation was at a triple level and Ghana's economy was deteriorating very fast. As a result, Ghana embarked a major programme of economic reforms through an IMF and World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programme and economic recovery programme (Twumasi-Baffour, 2019). The IMF emphasizes on the importance of a participatory approach to decision making as it promotes the application of key elements of a democratic environment consultation, the rule of law, transparency and accountability to economic policy making. Further, participatory approach

aims at broad consultation and consensus building, fosters ownership of the economic program by the civil society, a crucial element in making the program a success. It also increases the chances that government policies will be well conceived and fair (International Monetary Fund, 2017).

Ghana has followed this participatory approach to economic reform and has made significant economic and social progress in the last 20 years. Ghana's policy environment has improved and the political incentives have shifted tremendously due to increasingly fair and competitive democratic elections. Consequently, faster and more equitable economic growth has been registered as Ghana has maintained steady political changes that enable easy changes on economic reforms. In fact, the government made some changes regarding their spending which led to their economic stability and passed a new law (the first of its kind in the country) to oversee government spending. The Act was passed to ensure fiscal responsibility, macroeconomic stability, and debt sustainability. Additionally, the Act provides a key provision that gives parliament power to censure the Finance Minister as and when spending exceeds defined limits (Twumasi-Baffour, 2019).

Other, countries that are yet to make economic reforms on their markets continue to experience inflated costs of food in the system. Policy reforms are only a part of the overall on-going programme of market development and they cannot resolve all the economic problems in Africa thus, governments still have a vital role to play in order to develop key market institutions (United Nations, 2018). The IMF and the World Bank may appear still lacking legitimacy and accountability however, transparency has clearly increased, especially in the World Bank; internal and external audit is now in place as well as some claiming mechanisms. Additionally, the "voice and representation" gap is now less severe than it was before that big turning point, the global financial crisis. The good news is that change is possible. We are living in interesting times that are calling us to make further improvements in the big arena of international relations: most of the issues affecting our lives are global, so we need more global solutions possibly, more global democratic and economic solutions.

V. CONCLUSION

The rapid expansion of democratic regimes in the African continent produce a debate concerning their survival. The issue of democracy also encompasses another global trend i.e. the introduction of economic reforms which brings forth the question on whether democracy and economic reforms complement each other. There is no clear path suggesting that their interaction is either positive or negative but rather is dependent on the policies adopted by the regimes in power. In post-colonial states, the relationship is both positive and robust thus the more democratic a state is the greater its will to implement and sustain economic reforms. On the contrary, less democratic states often make less economic reforms and often fall back into authoritarian rule which is associated with the lack of economic reforms. Countries like Botswana and Ghana provide powerful examples that democratic governance can coexist with economic reforms. Other countries like Nigeria still struggle with the issue of democratic governance due to corruption thus are unable to make economic reforms that could translate to development for her citizens.

The way forward therefore encompasses the consideration of democracy and economic reforms as an ingredient to economic development by African countries. This consideration is very important as democracy without economic development is meaningless to the people. African states struggling with democratic governance can implement policies geared towards economic reforms and consequently economic development. Also, African states can also invest in human development as knowledgeable persons are better equipped to promote economic policies and reforms. Capacity commitment and policy intent are very crucial to democratic governance and economic reforms and in turn.

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